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Articles I
Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones:*
The Path to Judicial Independence in China
Stephen L. McPherson**
I. Introduction
In the scope of one generation, the People's Republic of China
("PRC") has gone from an economy predominated by central planning to
an economy driven by market forces. Investment from abroad and "red
capitalists," spurred on by Deng Xiaoping's admonition that "to get rich
is glorious,"' have adapted and enjoyed the fruit of China's rapidly
changing economy. However, China's continuing economic expansion
has created a number of new challenges. Foreign investors, red
capitalists, and small business entrepreneurs alike will not be so inclined
to continue the expansion and develop their enterprises without the
assurance that their investments in capital will be preserved. The web of
* See JOSEPH FEWSMITH, DILEMMAS OF REFORM IN CHINA 39 (2006).
** The author is a Ph.D. candidate in International Studies at Old Dominion
University. He is formerly an Instructor and Assistant Dean at Regent University School
of Law.
© Copyright 2008 Stephen L. McPherson.
1. Omar Swartz, Critical Thoughts on Law and Reform in Post-Maoist China, 8
GONZ J. INT'L L. 4, 6 (2004-2005) (citing ORVILL SCHELL, To GET RICH is GLORIOUS:
CHINA IN THE EIGHTIES (1984)).
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economic expansion will likely never completely penetrate the cell-like
localities of rural China unless there is consistency in the rules of
business, and how those rules are enforced when parties disagree about
their mutual obligations. Without such consistency, capitalists' incentive
to invest is limited. More fundamentally, the central government will not
maintain its legitimacy unless the people see that it empowers an
objective legal authority that reaches and is respected not just in the
eastern coastal municipalities but also in the western inland villages.
Aware that the future presents such challenges, the Chinese
Communist Party ("CCP") has embraced, in principle, the notion of the
rule of law in China.2 Jiang Zemin, in a speech before the Fifteenth
Party Congress, stated that "rule of law [is] central to economic
development, national stability, and Party legitimacy." 3  Jiang Zemin
further proclaimed that "the [CCP] is fully committed to 'govern the
country according to law. ''4  The Fifteenth Party Congress even
amended the CCP's charter to include governing by law and establishing
rule of law among its goals.5  Jiang's report to the Sixteenth Party
Congress in 2002 stated that "[n]o organization or individual enjoys any
privilege above the Constitution and laws."
6
Despite a ceremonial and even constitutional acceptance of the rule
of law in concept, the CCP and its minions persist in tolerating violations
of the rule of law. Rights advocates are jailed on manufactured charges.7
Lawyers who challenge the government for violation of rights or of the
rule of law suffer the consequences of being out of step with the party. 8
Low-level judges are pressured to make decisions that favor the interest
of the party. 9 Finally, judges who make decisions in disharmony with
2. Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 44
(2001).
3. Randall Peerenboom, A Government of Laws: Democracy, Rule of Law, and
Administrative Law Reform in China in DEBATING POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA: RULE OF
LAW VS. DEMOCRATIZATION, 72 (Suisheng Zhao ed., 2006).
4. Orts, supra note 2, at 45.
5. Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial Reform, 4
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 255, 261 (2003).
6. Id.
7. See Luisetta Mudie, China Detains Top Guangdong Rights Lawyer, RADIO FREE
ASIA, Sept. 15, 2006, http://www.rfa.org/english/china/china-guofeixiong-
20060915.html?searchterm=None (last visited May 13, 2008) (explaining the detention
of Guangdong Lawyer and rights advocate Guo Feixiong on suspicion of running an
illegal business).
8. See Luisetta Mudie, Rights Group Slams Legal System as China Jails Blind
Activist, RADIO FREE ASIA, Aug. 31, 2006, http://www.rfa.org/english/china/
chinaactivist-2006083 I.html?searchterm=None (last visited May 13, 2008) (explaining
the jailing of Chen Guangcheng who called authorities to account for official abuses
under China's one child policy).
9. See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
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the party find themselves out of favor and risk the loss of their offices.' 0
If China's economic expansion is to continue, the rule of law must
become more than mere verbiage in a statement of policy, whether that
statement is uttered by the president or memorialized in China's
constitution. A full acceptance of the rule of law must take place
because of its vital importance to the international community, including
China's neighbors and trading partners; to international businesses
headquartered in China; and most importantly, to the Chinese people
who already question the party's receipt of all too much of the reward for
China's economic expansion."'
This Article will explore the issue of rule of law reform in China.
Specifically, it will examine the issue of judicial independence. While
the rule of law on the whole is critical to China's future, the
independence of China's judiciary is perhaps the most critical aspect of
rule of law reform. Cultural differences and challenges cloud
understanding of the meaning of rule of law reform. Part I will establish
the necessary definitional framework for the rule of law. Part II will
summarily raise some political/cultural considerations for rule of law
reform in China and will explore China's distinctive conceptions of the
rule of law. Part III describes China's legal system. Part IV will address
institutional obstacles to judicial independence in China and some
suggested solutions. Part V will address center/periphery obstacles to
judicial independence in China. Part VI will engage in a briefcase study
analysis comparing economic (rural and enterprise) reform with rule of
law reform in China.
II. Defining the Rule of Law
While the rule of law in China and elsewhere has received various
definitions from various parties, scholars agree upon a number of core
components to having a nation that supports the rule of law. The
International Bar Association's recent statement on the subject embodies
most of these core components:
The Rule of Law is the only system so far devised to provide
impartial control of the use of state power. That single sentence is
sufficient to explain why the Rule of Law is pre-eminently the best
available system for organizing civil society.
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 24 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/60/Add. 1 (Mar. 4,
2004) (prepared by Leandro Despouy).
10. See Jim Yardley, A Judge Tests China's Courts, Making History, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/28/intemational/asia/28judge.html?ex=
1290834000&en=ace85e8658820210&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (last visited
May 13, 2008).
11. Peerenboom, supra note 3, at 70.
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Resolution of IBA Council-September 2005
An independent judiciary; the presumption of innocence; the right to
a fair and public trial without undue delay; a rational and
proportionate approach to punishment; a strong and independent legal
profession; strict protection of confidential communications between
lawyer and client; equality of all before the law; these are all
fundamental principles of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, arbitrary
arrests; secret trials; indefinite detention without trial; cruel or
degrading treatment or punishment; intimidation or corruption in the
electoral process; are all unacceptable.
The Rule of Law is the foundation of a civilized society. It
establishes a transparent process accessible and equal to all. It
ensures adherence to principles that both liberate and protect.
12
Other key attributes to the rule of law include the notion that 1) the rules
are pre-fixed and preannounced, 2) all are equal before the law and no
man is above the law, 3) fixed formal procedures that are characterized
by "consistency, predictability, calculability," 4) protection of
capital/property, 5) limits to corruption, 6) a correct level of regulation,
7) transparency and accountability, and 8) proportionality.
13
III. Political/Cultural Considerations for Rule of Law Reform
Until recently, the Chinese conception of the rule of law could be
characterized as "rule by law," or use of law as an instrument by the
government to restrain the citizen, instead of "rule of law," which
restrains not only the citizenry but also the government.' 4 Additionally,
earlier Chinese conceptions of the rule of law might also be termed rule
of man or rule by person. 15 The development of institutions has helped
to curb rule of man or rule by person in contemporary China but has not
totally eradicated the notion of rule of man or rule by person.
The Chinese conception of the rule of law is further complicated by
12. Francis Neate & Fernando Pombo, Officers of the Int'l B. Ass'n, Open Letter to
Attendees at the Int'l B. Ass'n & Am. B. Ass'n Rule of Law Symposium (Sept. 2006).
13. Bo Li, What is Rule of Law?, I PERSP. No. 5, (Apr. 30, 2000), available at
http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives/5_043000/what is rule of law.htm; see also Steven
Leavitt, Address at the Int'l B. Ass'n & Am. B, Ass'n Rule of L. Symposium (Sept. 16,
2006).
14. Orts, supra note 2, at 50-54.
15. Id. at 50, 52; see also Graig R. Avino, China's Judiciary: An Instrument of
Democratic Change, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. R. 369, at 372 (2003) (citing ALBERT HUNG
YEE CtEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (1992)).
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two normative schools of thought: Confucianism and Legalism. 16 These
two schools of thought are analogous to Western notions of "natural law"
and "positive law.' 17 Natural law theory denounces law that undermines
morality as non-law.18 Similarly, Confucianism stresses the importance
of having moral men in leadership over coercive legal rules and elevates
the importance of moral leaders to live out and apply the law above the
importance of enforcing legal rules. 19 A good leader then serves as a
substitute for a good system.20  By contrast, Western positivism and
Chinese Legalism stress the use of law by a sovereign to shape
behavior.2'
A historical lack of separation between the powers of the judiciary
and the power of governmental officials creates a great cultural obstacle
to judicial independence.22 Officials placing pressure upon judges and
magistrates who resolve disputes is not a recent phenomenon. 3
The historical lack of a legal profession in China created a litigation
system that was both slow and expensive.24 Trials were very unpleasant
sometimes resulting in torture for parties and/or witnesses.25
Consequently, the history of the litigation system serves as a disincentive
for the Chinese people to resort to litigation to solve their disputes.26
Problems with litigation discouraged would-be litigants and
encouraged mediation by local village leaders instead. 7 Mediations
were conducted and resolved with Confucian rules of morality.
28
Furthermore, litigation was avoided at all costs because disputes were
discouraged under Confucian teaching.29
Group orientation is another Confucian principle that impacts the
political culture of China's legal system and judiciary. However, it need
not be applied so as to completely trust the morality of the great leader or
the party. Instead of blind trust for the great leader, accountability for
corruption and lack of objectivity through an independent judiciary can
16. Orts, supra note 2, at 51.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 52.
20. LUCIAN W. PYE, THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE POLITICS, 18-19 (1968).
21. Orts, supra note 2, at 53-56.
22. Sam Hanson, The Chinese Century: An American Judge's Observations of the
Chinese Legal System, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 248, 250 (2001); see also Avino, supra
note 15, at 373, 378.
23. Avino, supra note 15, at 373-74.
24. Id. at 373.
25. Id. at 374.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 374.
28. Avino, supra note 15, at 374.
29. Id. at 373-74.
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also serve the interests of group orientation. 30 If the Confucian ideal
teaches that the public interest is to be supreme, the judiciary must be
detached from the party so that China's judges can act independently in
the public interest without fear of reprisal by party and without the
present level of incentive to engage in corruption.3'
IV. China's Legal System
China's legal system is heavily influenced by China's cultural and
political heritage. Prior to the entry of western influences in the early
2 0 th century, China did not have a legal profession.32 The Imperial
examination system served to qualify officials for office.33 By virtue of
office, officials became the arbiters of disputes despite the lack of any
special equipping or training for legal or judicial types of functions.
Consequently, disputes were resolved in accord with generalized
Confucian principles.34
When Western influences manifested themselves and the
examination system ceased, a legal system began to develop but ceased
during WWII and China's civil war. Then, Mao obtained control, and
"law was completely eliminated from China and replaced by a precarious
balance between policy considerations and the capricious will of the
rulers., 35 Mao's "rule of man" replaced and undermined any previous
state of legal reform and persisted throughout Mao's leadership.36 In
fact, during the Cultural Revolution, Mao abolished laws, closed all
remaining law schools, and his "pronouncements were believed to be the
only source of law."3 7  This state of affairs continued through the
Cultural Revolution until the rule of law was proposed in the late
seventies.38 Therefore, for the first thirty years of the PRC, courts had no
impact upon the people's lives. 39  Administrative officials resolved
40
conflicts and the courts, when they existed, only had marginal power.
30. Lin, supra note 5, at 264-65.
31. Id.
32. Weifang He, China's Legal Profession: The Nascence and Growing Pains of a
Professionalized Legal Class, 19 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 138, 139 (2005).
33. Id.
34. Id at 139-40.
35. Id. at 145.
36. Avino, supra note 15, at 376-77.
37. Id. at 377 (citing Wang Chenguang, Introduction: An Emerging Legal System, in
INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 1, 11 (Wang Chenguang et al. eds., 1997)).
38. He, supra note 32, at 145.
39. Xin Chunying, What Kind of Judicial Power Does China Need?, 1 INT'L J. OF
CONST. L. 58, 60 (2003).
40. Id.
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A. Newness of Legal Profession
The dearth of legal professionals in China has had a profound
impact upon the development of the nation's legal system. An American
judge visiting China reported that in Xi'an province, a fifty-five year old
was the senior lawyer.4' It is likely that individuals even in this
relatively young age group-young when compared with the ages of
seasoned practitioners in other nations-are a rarity in China because of
the nascence of its legal profession. China's legal profession has few
traditions to draw upon because of the eradication of the legal systems
and profession under Mao.4 2 Most lawyers are relatively young in the
profession.43 Consequently, new lawyers cannot and will not have the
kind of mentoring and professional development training that is so
typical in nation-states with fully developed legal professions.
While aggressive lawyering is the norm in some nations, aggressive
advocacy in China is deemed impolite. 4 The Honorable Sam Hanson,
an American appellate court judge, shares an anecdote from his visit to
China where a young aggressive lawyer defending a criminal case in a
rural region was arrested for "illegally obtaining evidence" the first day
of trial.45 The implication of the story was that he was arrested, at least
in part, because of aggressive lawyering and because he had interviewed
multiple witnesses.46 He was held for five months and his license was
revoked.47
China's system of legal education has grown a great deal since the
beginning of the reform movement in the late seventies. In 1979, China
had only two law schools and approximately two to three thousand
lawyers.48 By 1999, China's legal education system had grown to over
two hundred law schools and its legal profession had swelled to over
100,000 lawyers. 49 Today, China has roughly 120,000 lawyers and three
hundred law schools.50 For comparison, the United States had a reported
41. Hanson, supra note 22, at 249.
42. Id. at 251.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 252.
45. Id. at 252.
46. Hanson, supra note 22, at 251-52.
47. Id.
48. Jamie P. Horsley, The Rule of Law in China: Incremental Progress, at 8 (Mar.
2006), available at http://www.chinabalancesheet.org/Documents/PaperRule-of
Law.PDF#search='The%20Rule%20oP/o2OLaw/20in%20China%3A%20%201ncrement
al%20Progress%2C%20Jamie%20P.%2OHorsley%2OMarch%202006'; Paul Gewirtz,
The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 603, 604 (2003).
49. Gewirtz, supra note 48, at 604.
50. Horsley, supra note 48, at 8.
2008]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
191 law schools in 2005-2006."1
At a population of 1.3 billion, this means that China has one lawyer
for every eight thousand people. For comparison, the United States has
1.1 million lawyers for 300 million people or 1 lawyer for every 300
people.52
The newness of China's legal profession carries over into the
judiciary. In the past, retired military officers with no particular legal
training have typically served as the predominant pool of candidates for
low-level judgeships.53 Judges' professional training varies. However,
substantial improvements in judicial training have been realized. In
1995, only 6.9% of judges had an undergraduate education.54 By 2005,
51.6% of judges had undergraduate degrees.55
With the passing of the 1995 Judges Law, judicial professionalism
has increased greatly in China.56 Judges have uniform qualifications
including both education and expertise.57  This increase in
professionalism has given the judiciary heightened status in the public
eye and enhanced the perception of and notion of judicial
independence.58 However, the Judges Law is not uniformly enforced and
the courts still have a long way to go towards true judicial
independence.59
B. Court System
The Chinese court system is a hierarchical system with four levels.6°
51. 2005-2006 ABA Legal Educ. Statistics: Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963-
2005, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-%20l.pdf (last visited
Mar. 5, 2008).
52. Hanson, supra note 22, at 248; see also ABA Nat'l Lawyer Population by State,
http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/2007_NatlLawyerFINALonepage.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2008).
53. Law in Political Transitions: Lessons from East Asia and the Road Ahead for
China, Before the Cong. Executive Comm 'n on China 8 (2005) (written statement of
Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law, N.Y.U.), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/
hearings/072605/Cohen.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Cohen Statement];
Avino, supra note 15, at 38 1; Hanson, supra note 22, at 249.
54. Cohen Statement, supra note 53, at 8.
55. Id.
56. Judges Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 28, 1995, effective Jul. 1, 1995) (P.R.C.); Cohen
Statement, supra note 53; Avino, supra note 15, at 385.
57. Avino, supra note 15, at 385.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Congressional Executive Commission on China: Chinese Courts and Judicial
Reform, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/rol/judreform.php?PHPSESSID=d212
d2e7922b79edbf635dbba4c6b37f (last visited Mar. 5, 2008) [hereinafter CEC on Chinese
Judiciary].
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61As of 2006, Approximately 200,000 judges served within the system.
The lowest level consisted of the three thousand Basic People's Courts at
the county or district level.62 The next level up is the Intermediate
People's Court.63 390 Intermediate People's Courts operated over the
cities and prefectures. 64 Thirty-one High People's Courts operated at the
provincial levels in the provincial capitals.65 The Supreme People's
Court, the highest judicial organ, is located in Beijing.66
Highest Supreme People's Court National I
High People's Courts Provincial 31
Lowest Intermediate People's Courts City and Prefecture 390
Basic People's Courts Rural/County & City/District 3,000
V. Addressing Institutional Obstacles to Judicial Independence
In the CCP's Fifteenth National Congress Jiang advocated
"providing systematic guarantees for the judicial organ to exercise power
independently and openly., 67  Both the party and its leader have
embraced the notion of judicial independence. While the term judicial
independence is subject to interpretation, China's judiciary should take
the party at its word and begin to gradually make decisions in furtherance
of that end. Institutional judicial independence and legal profession
independence are desperately needed to balance unbridled party power.68
A. One Party System
The most significant structural challenge to an independent
judiciary in China is the one party system. The CCP controls the
National People's Congress ("NPC"). The NPC virtually functions as
the single branch of government in China. The NPC through its
Standing Committee plays a preeminent role in the appointment of
judges.69 Through the State Councils, it also supervises the licensing of
61. Horsley, supra note 48, at 6.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Horsley, supra note 48, at 6.; see also XIAN FA art. 127, § 7 (1982) (P.R.C.).
67. Avino, supra note 15, at 389; Xin, supra note 39, at 59.
68. Orts, supra note 2, at 111.
69. XIAN FA art. 67(12), § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.).
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lawyers.7°
The Chinese state is structured such that the NPC is "the highest
organ of state power., 71 The Standing Committee of the NPC serves as a
permanent body representing the NPC.7 2 The Standing Committee's
authority extends well beyond the traditional authority of a legislative
body and includes the power of constitutional and statutory
interpretation.73 Chapter III, Section 1, Article 67 of the Constitution of
the People's Republic of China vests authority in the Standing
Committee of the NPC to "interpret the Constitution and supervise its
enforcement" and "to interpret statutes.
74
The NPC elects and may recall from office the President of the
Supreme People's Court. 75  The Standing Committee of the NPC
appoints and may recall from office Vice-Presidents and judges of the
Supreme People's Court.76 Furthermore, "[t]he Supreme People's Court
is responsible to the [NPC] and its Standing Committee., 77 Local courts
are likewise responsible to lower level governmental powers.78
This vesting of enactment, enforcement and interpretive power
within one body creates a major structural challenge to the development
of an independent judiciary in China. This problem is further
compounded by the fact that the courts' funding and infrastructure are
provided by their local people's congresses.79
B. Funding and Infrastructure
China's constitution on its face states that the courts "exercise
judicial power independently; '80 however, in reality judges are very
70. Under article sixty-seven, subsection six of the Constitution of the People's
Republic of China, the Standing Committee of the NPC supervises the State Council.
XIAN FA art. 67(6), § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.). It also appoints the leadership of the State
Councils. XIAN FA art. 62(5), § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.). The judicial administration under the
State Council supervises the licensing of lawyers and can issue warnings and other
disciplinary measures. Law on Lawyers (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., May 15, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997) chp. II, art. 6, chp. I, art. 4
(P.R.C.).
71. XIAN FA art. 57, § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.).
72. Id.
73. XIAN FA art. 67(1), (4), § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.).
74. XIAN FA art. 67(1), § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.); see also Law on Legislation art.
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective Jul.
1, 2000) chp. II, § 4 art. 42 (P.R.C.) ("The power to interpret a national law shall vest in
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.").
75. XIANFA art. 63(4), § 1 (1982) (P.R.C.).
76. Id. at art. 67(11), § 1.
77. Id. at art. 128, § 7.
78. Id.
79. Horsley, supra note 48, at 7.
80. XIANFA art. 126, § 7 (1982) (P.R.C.)
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dependent upon officials.8 ' The courts are entirely too dependent upon
local government officials to achieve true judicial independence. Local
officials hold appointment and removal power and the local government
provides financing for the local courts.82 Basic People's Courts depend
upon the local people's congresses and local officials for their salary,
budget, personal housing, offices and courthouses.83 Objectivity and
independent judgment is difficult to maintain when judges decide cases
that impact governmental officials who provide the judges'
84compensation.
Judges are not highly compensated. Because they receive so little,
temptation to accept bribes and engage in corruption is high. In
Shanghai, where judges are better compensated and have high social
status, the judges are less likely to be corrupt or accept bribes.85
86Shanghai judges simply have more to lose if they engage in corruption.
Judges in Shanghai earn around $8,750 (U.S.), 3.5 times the income of
judges in other localities.8 7
At times, an administrative official exerts so much power over
judges in cases where the official has a personal interest as to cause a
merger of the trial and enforcement of judgment processes in a single
hearing.88 Judges are often given instructions by political leaders on
individual cases. 89 Sometimes the instructions are oral, sometimes they
are in writing, or even included in official documents, with a requirement
that the judge report back on the results.90
The courts' connection to the CCP, not at just the national level, but
at the local level as well, presents major institutional obstacles to judicial
independence. To accomplish reform, judges and courts on the local
level must become separate from local government leaders at the same
level. 91  It has been suggested that having courts extend across
jurisdictional lines might prevent these close connections and the
structural problem associated with funding and supervision by
localities.92 Furthermore, having appointment and removal power vested
81. Xin, supra note 39, at 69-70.
82. Id. at 74.
83. Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant If He Stays With His Sheep?
Justice in Rural China, 114 YALE L.J. 1675, 1685 (2005).
84. Horsley, supra note 48, at 7.
85. Mei Ying Gechlik, Judicial Reform: Lessons From Shanghai, 19 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 37, 128 (Spring/Fall 2005).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Xin, supra note 39, at 74.
89. Xin, supra note 39, at 69-70.
90. Id.
91. Lin, supra note 5, at 296-97.
92. Id.
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outside of the locality in which judges sit, would relieve the judges from
any sense of obligation to the local officials who appoint them.
93
C. Layers of Supervision
Judges in the PRC function under layers of supervision. They are
supervised internally by other judges within the court, by the NPC and its
counterparts on the local level (as described above), and by the public. 94
"[B]asic court judges' [have] many masters: the parties before [them],
other residents, local government agencies, and the judicial hierarchy." 95
Some supervision is helpful for accountability; excessive supervision can
interfere with neutrality and judicial independence.96
1. Internal Supervision
Internal factors and controls upon the independence of judges can
compromise their independence as easily as external concerns. Just as
higher ranking administrative officials can correct the decisions of lower
ranking officials, higher ranking judges on the same level can correct the
decisions of other lower ranking judges.97 Even in Shanghai, which has
one of the best trained and most highly compensated courts, senior
judges exert influence over junior judges.98 To avoid tampering by
higher level judges with greater connection with an individual case, trial
judges must have authority to resolve disputes before them with finality.
The assignment of cases to a judge to whom an interested party has
connections can also serve as an institutional barrier to judicial
independence. In Qingdao City, Shandong Province, the court system
has begun randomly assigning cases to avoid lack of independence in
adjudication and judge shopping. 99
2. Party Supervision
While the supervision of China's judiciary need not be removed
completely from the party, party officials certainly should not supervise
judges based upon individual cases. 00 Instead party or government
officials should supervise the court system by reviewing reports and
other statistical documents. They should then work through the power to
93. Id. at 297-98.
94. Xin, supra note 39, at 69.
95. Upham, supra note 83, at 1687.
96. Xin, supra note 39, at 69.
97. Id. at 67.
98. Gechlik, supra note 85, at 128.
99. Xin, supra note 39, at 68.
100. Id. at 70.
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appoint and remove judicial officials to regulate the system and not
individual cases within the system.'01
As noted above, the 1995 Judges Law has initiated great progress
towards a more professional, a more regularized, and thereby a stronger
and more independent judiciary. 10 2 While some regulation of the courts
is appropriate, excessive regulation would undermine judicial
independence. 10 3 For example, to achieve true judicial independence, the
process of evaluating judges for loyalty to the party should cease. 10 4 In
addition, the notion that judges can not make decisions that could
undermine state interests or damage the state is problematic. 0 5 The
courts cannot hold the state, as a party to a dispute, accountable to the
rule of law if the courts are required to never undermine state interests.
3. Public Supervision
Like the rest of China's government, the courts are under constant
scrutiny by the public. To establish their authority and legitimacy, the
courts must be perceived as the final decision maker for disputes.
10 6
When party or government officials interfere with or undermine judicial
decision making, judges are viewed as powerless. 0 7  They lose the
respect of the people. Strengthening the courts so that government or
party officials do not have power to tamper with the judges' decision
making process will establish judicial authority.' 08
In the past, the courts have also made decisions in dereliction to the
law so as to insure that the public sees those decisions as just and
equitable. Dean Zhu Suli of Beijing University Law School provides an
illustrative example: A policeman legally shot a motorcycle driver. 0 9
The motorcycle crashed killing one of the passengers. 110 The young man
who died was the second son of the family to die in one year."' The
mother and the local people wanted the policeman held accountable."
2
When the local prosecutor and the courts did not hold the officer
accountable, the dead man's mother committed suicide."13 In response,
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 69.
104. Avino, supra note 15, at 387.
105. Id. at 387-88.
106. Xin, supra note 39, at 78.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Upham supra note 83, at 1683.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1684.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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the matter was revisited, the policeman was indicted, and the court
convicted him but suspended his sentence even though he had committed
no crime.' 14
While this sort of practice will develop court legitimacy in the near
term, it will do little to establish the consistent rule of law in the long
term. If the courts intend to truly elevate the rule of law, they must
establish independence not only from the party state, but from the people
and popular opinion as well.
D. Incentives for an Independent Judiciary Under a One-Party System
Some have argued that an independent judiciary and an independent
legal profession will threaten party supremacy such that the party will
never tolerate it. To the contrary, incremental steps towards
independence for the judiciary and the legal profession are essential to
the preservation of CCP legitimacy and to China's economic
development.
1. Party Legitimacy
Judicial independence is an essential ingredient to the preservation
and legitimacy of the CCP. 115 Instead of permitting corruption between
judges, local officials, and others with connections, an independent
judiciary will reduce the possibility of future corruption. Instead of
permitting those with appropriate party connections to violate the law
with impunity, an independent judiciary will strengthen the ability of law
enforcement to fight crime.1 16  Finally, many of the party members
themselves are not so old as to have forgotten the tragedy of the Cultural
Revolution.' 17  An independent judiciary will prevent the kinds of
arbitrariness and abuses that characterized the Cultural Revolution and
the "whatever Mao says," rule of man approach to law.'
18
As China's people have grown more sophisticated and gained a
greater exposure to information via the internet and other forms of
media, they have become increasingly aware of individual rights.' 19 This
growing "rights-consciousness in Chinese society" has not replaced
Confucian group orientation and reverence for morality of leadership.
120
However, it has definitely created an increasing need for objective civil
114. Upham, supra note 83, at 1684.
115. Gewirtz, supra note 48, at 604-05.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Peerenboom, supra note 3, at 59.
119. Gewirtz, supra note 48, at 605.
120. Id.
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means to resolve disputes.12 1  An independent judicial system where
judges are free of obligations to party officials in resolving disputes will
provide such means. Creating a fair and equitable system for dispute
resolution will enhance party legitimacy while only modestly
compromising party supremacy.12
2
Corruption, increases in unemployment in the cities, and the
phasing out of state-owned enterprises, coupled with the inability for
pensioners to obtain benefits, have all created discontentment among the
Chinese working class. 123 Additionally, working class people are well
aware of the vast profits and disproportionate concentration of wealth in
the hands of government officials and those with connections to
government officials. 124 In the face of a potentially unstable banking
system, and remaining state-owned enterprises that are overleveraged,
the people need to have the assurance that at least some of their
institutions are moving towards security and stability. 25 The CCP can
accomplish this by moving towards an independent judiciary.
2. Economic Development
Continued economic development is also critically important to
sustaining the one-party system. China's developing economy and
market system present problems that can only be resolved through an
independent legal system. 126 Along with economic development, China
has experienced a concomitant increase in business crime and
corruption.127 An independent judiciary is an essential ingredient to
China's continued prosperity and development, and to the infusion of
foreign capital. 28
China's progressive transition to a market-based economy "has
fostered clientelism and corporatism."'' 2 9  Companies often establish
relationships with governmental officials to gain a competitive advantage
for resources controlled by those officials and for favor when needed.
130
When disputes arise, a very weak judiciary often does not hold the
blameworthy parties accountable, sometimes because of bias or
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Larry Diamond, The Rule of Law as Transition to Democracy in China, in
DEBATING POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA: RULE OF LAW VS. DEMOCRATIZATION 79, 80
(Suisheng Zhao, ed., 2006).
124. Id. at 79.
125. NICHOLAS LARDY, CHINA'S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 80 (1998).
126. Peerenboom, supra note 3, at 68.
127. Lin, supra note 5, at 260.
128. Peerenboom, supra note 3, at 68.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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corruption. Consequently, would-be investors are deterred from
investing capital.1
31
To support continued growth, a developing market economy must
have rules to govern it, and a neutral and objective arbiter of disputes
when those rules are violated. 32 Otherwise, growth will plateau and the
developing economy will not have the systemic support it needs to
flourish.
133
Market interests require a legal system where contract rights,
security interests, and ownership rights can be protected and
preserved.134  International investors and domestic enterprises alike
expect to have their interests protected.1 35 International investors are
especially concerned about compliance with international legal norms. 13
6
While some level of administrative regulation is certainly appropriate,
investors will be deterred from continuing the rapid pace of investment
in China unless they know that administrative and local government
officials can be held in check by independent judges.1 37
Furthermore, to fulfill the terms of accession to the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), China must demonstrate that its courts are
characterized by judicial independence.1 38 If China cannot demonstrate
judicial independence, China will not satisfy the WTO's exacting
requirements.
1 39
China's economic progress has already altered the state-society
balance of power, reallocating power possessed by the state to an
economically developing society, and reducing the CCP's domination of
political ideology. 40 This shifting of power will act as a catalyst for not
only continued economic reform, but for judicial independence as well.
E. A Plausibility Probe for Judicial Independence Under a One-Party
System
Some scholars have questioned whether judicial independence is
even possible under a one-party system. China's judiciary is often
viewed as "simply a government department under the executive."'' 41
China's constitution seems to support this notion in some ways and to
131. Id. at 73.
132. Horsley, supra note 48, at 10.
133. Id. at 1, 10.
134. Peerenboom, supra note 3, at 59.
135. Id. at 73.
136. Gewirtz, supra note 48, at 604-05.
137. Id.
138. Lin, supra note 5, at 298.
139. Id.
140. Peerenboom, supra note 3, at 73; see also Lin, supra note 5, at 261.
141. Orts, supra note 2, at 75.
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undermine it in others.
The United States and Japan are both democracies. The judges in
both nations have strong party allegiances at the time of appointment to
the bench. In the United States, appointed judges are likely affiliated
with and loyal to either the Democrat or Republican Party at the time of
their appointments. In Japan, judges have most likely been drawn from
Japan's dominant Liberal Democratic Party. 14 2 However, in both courts,
judges issue rulings against the dominant or appointing party. 143 In the
United States Supreme Court, it is not unusual for a justice to develop a
judicial philosophy at odds with preferences of his or her appointing
party.
Despite the fact that China could not be described as a democracy,
the United States and Japan both provide fine examples of how judges
function with some objectivity in a political environment. Political
factors still play a role in Japan but not nearly the role these factors play
in China.144 Once appointed, it would seem that China's judges should
reduce or cut ties to the party in the interests of objective, independent
judgment.
F. Judicial Review
Because of the Chinese constitution, China's judiciary is still a part
of a system supervised by the party, which has the power to interpret
laws. 45 The Legal Work Committee of the Standing Committee of the
NPC has created a special office for claims of constitutional violations
by government actions or regulation. But, in this office, party officials
are acting as reviewers of claims against party officials. 1
46
Consequently, at present, China's constitution is merely a statement
of CCP policies interpreted by CCP member government officials. To
give China's constitution force and life similar to the constitutions of
other nation-states, China's courts must be empowered to hold the
government accountable for violation of the rights conferred in the
constitution and must have the structural and legal independence to do so
without reprisal. 1
47
In the 1803 landmark case, Marbury v. Madison, the United States
142. Upham, supra note 83, at 1716-17.
143. In Japan, while "observers of the Japanese judiciary agree that judges feel
constrained to decide cases within the range of what is politically acceptable to the
Secretariat of the Liberal Democratic Party ... courts have in several instances ruled
against the LDP in politically charged cases." Id. at 1717.
144. Id.
145. Avino, supra note 15, at 384.
146. Cohen Statement, supra note 53, at 7.
147. Lin, supra note 5, at 270.
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Supreme Court observed that "[t]he government of the United States has
been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."'' 48 Judicial review
furnishes the remedy the Court references. While full-fledged judicial
review akin to the United States Supreme Court's definition of judicial
review in Marbury v. Madison is not likely in China, some form of
judicial review to enforce the constitution and to interpret statutes must
be implemented. Otherwise, China's constitution will remain
meaningless. 149
To some extent China has already taken steps towards a system of
judicial review. It has implemented judicial review in the administrative
law context with the Administrative Litigation Law ("ALL"). 15° This
law gives people and enterprises a right to sue for violation of their rights
by administrative agencies. 151 In the ten years since its enactment,
China's courts have decided over one half million cases and disposed of
40% of them in favor of the plaintiff. 52  For example, since the
enactment of the ALL, plaintiffs have successfully brought claims
against state-owned enterprises for showing favoritism in the allocation
of scarce resources, and against a city planning board to prevent the
construction of an observation tower because of aesthetic reasons.1
53
While far from a complete system of judicial review, the ALL
marks a first step towards making government accountable to citizens
under rule of law. 154  The subjection of administrative agencies to
judicial scrutiny may also be a first step towards other kinds of judicial
scrutiny. 155 The Supreme People's Court has already engaged in such
judicial scrutiny in a 2001 decision in which it held that a student had a
right to an education under the Chinese constitution. 5 6 Conservatives
have labeled the decision "judicial activism.' 57 However, this decision
and the ALL are significant steps towards judicial independence down
the road.
148. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
149. Lin, supra note 5, at 271.
150. Id. at 280.
151. Congressional Executive Commission on China, CECC 2003 Annual Report:
Legal Restraints on Government Power, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/
rol/legalrestraints.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Legal Restraints on
Government Power].
152. Lin, supra note 5, at 28.
153. Id. at 284-85.
154. Legal Restraints on Government Power, supra note 151.
155. Cohen Statement, supra note 53, at 7.
156. Lin, supra note 5, at 271-72.
157. Id.; see also Xin, supra note 39, at 77.
[Vol. 26:4
CROSSING THE RIVER BY FEELING THE STONES
V. Addressing Center/Periphery Obstacles to Judicial Independence
Although economic reform has done much to close the gap between
urban and rural society in China, there remains a great disparity between
the two.1 58 If the rule of law is to fully take form in China, the reach of
an independent judiciary must not halt in the cities. 159 It must penetrate
into rural village life as well. 160 Otherwise, the value and utility of an
independent judiciary will not be fully realized.
One scholar describes an anecdote about a local Basic People's
Court judge traveling to a village within his jurisdiction to collect a debt
from a rural farmer. 161 The judge first finds the village cadre and local
law enforcement officials.1 62 The group then travels to the farmer's field,
pulls him aside from his labors to discuss the matter and then proceeds to
the porch of the defendant farmer's home to resolve the matter. 63 The
dispute was successfully resolved and the farmer paid a fair portion of
what he owed.164
At the time of the scholar's anecdote, government policy required a
courtroom, professional dress, and all of the pomp and prestige of a
respected judicial branch.1 65 However, the village in the anecdote, and
others like it, were too distant from the state center, and too diffuse in
their customs and practices to respect the court as an institution unless
the judge brought the law to the village.1 66 By going to the village, the
judge weakened the institutional strength and authority of the court;
however, he or she gained the confidence of the people by reaching them
in conjunction with the authority of the local cadre. 167 The approach
provided a pragmatic, temporal solution to the problems of the village,
but arguably weakened and undermined the power and uniformity of the
judiciary.
The institutional reality is that the trial judge works for the
government and is ultimately responsible to the government. However,
the judge's power is limited and must be utilized in a village setting
where national norms may not be received. 168 Local Basic People's
Court judges often become a part of the local administrative government
resolving disputes and defusing conflict by vindicating local expectations
158. Upham, supra note 83, at 1678-81.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1679.
162. Id.
163. Upham, supra note 83, at 1679.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1680.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Upham, supra note 83, at 1692.
2008]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
instead of strictly upholding state norms. 169
Two examples are instructive. First, two parties had a dispute over
a field ox. 170 Instead of strictly applying the law, the local court system
ultimately made a common sense evaluation of the parties' dispute and
made an award that was not strictly in accord with the law but provided
some compensation to the aggrieved party.171  Second, a husband
threatened a man in his village after discovering that his wife had had an
affair with the man. 172 The village committee attempted to resolve the
dispute and the man even offered the husband money to settle the
matter. 173 The husband refused and persisted in his threat. 174 The man
filed suit seeking to enjoin the husband. 75 The husband retaliated by
filing a claim against the man for money damages. 76  The court
unlawfully jailed the man, putting him into "protective custody,"
threatened both parties, and resolved the situation with a payment from
the man to the husband. 177 Again, no legal rules had been violated by the
man who committed adultery, 78 yet, the court resolved the matter so that
both parties would receive some satisfaction.
179
Judges in each of these cases ignored the law to provide some
satisfaction to the parties and to leave the village with the clear
impression that justice had been accomplished. 80 This makes the rural
judge much more like the justice of the peace in the early American legal
system or an imperial magistrate in the historical Chinese legal system
than a judge. 181
Before recent developments toward judicial professionalism, such
as the enactment of the 1995 Judges Law and the commencement of an
examination process, rural Chinese judges were usually military
officers.182 They were viewed as coming "from the people" and not
outside elites. 183 In selecting local judges, rural localities were also often
169. Id. at 1711.
170. Id. at 1689-90.
171. Id. at 1690.
172. Id.
173. Upham, supra note 83, at 1690.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Upham, supra note 83, at 1690-91, at 1690-91.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1692.
181. Id. at 1687.
182. Cohen Statement, supra note 53, at 8; Avino, supra note 15, at 381; Hanson,
supra note 22, at 249; Upham, supra note 83, at 1681. See also supra Part III.A
(discussing rural Chinese judges).
183. Swartz, supra note 1, at 5.
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pragmatically concerned with "how much [money] a judge can generate
for the court.
1 84
As the criteria for appointment of judges change, it may create more
independence and consistency, but might also weaken cooperation of
local officials and create greater suspicion and distrust by local
populations.1 85 As new judicial professionals take on roles within rural
communities, they will face a danger that the people will not perceive
judges to be part of their community. 186 Furthermore, an outsider will
not have the necessary familiarity with local custom to resolve disputes
in a manner the local population will understand or fully appreciate.
1 87
While China does need a more modernized and independent court
system, rural China, which comprises a majority of the population, acts
under a system where dispute resolution works differently than in urban
China.188 The rural system differs from the system in urban China
because of a large disparity in legal sophistication and culture from
eastern cities to western rural villages. 89  In urban commercial life,
rights are documented, clearer, and quantifiable, and the parties are
usually aware of those rights. 190 However, in rural village life, neighbors
and relatives are part of a network that makes relationships, even
business relationships, decidedly less clear.' 91 The people are concerned
not so much with profit as with the necessities of life and livelihood.
Furthermore, they seldom document their transactions in writing.192
Consequently, rural China's judges have historically focused upon
rightness of results instead of regularization of procedure. 1
93
This rural/urban distinction creates great challenges for the
development of a consistent, independent, and objective judiciary. Three
incremental processes will serve to overcome these challenges. First, as
in urban China, the development of market economies in rural China will
serve to regularize commercial relationships and help to close the
disparity between community mores and national statutes. 194 Second, the
judiciary will serve as a key component to bring statutory law to rural
China. Rural judges must have sufficient institutional authority to stand
184. Xin, supra note 39, at 72.
185. Upham, supra note 83, at 1688.
186. Swartz, supra note 1, at 5-6.
187. Upham, supra note 83, at 1688.
188. Xin, supra note 39, at 74-75.
189. Upham, supra note 83, at 1687.
190. Id. at 1692-93.
191. Id. at 1693.
192. Id.
193. Xin, supra note 39, at 75.
194. Upham, supra note 83, at 1699-1700.
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up against interference from government officials. 9' To gain such
institutional authority over time and to garner trust and legitimacy, rural
judges and courts must satisfactorily and fairly resolve village disputes.
Developing this level of legitimacy and trust will take time. Eventually,
residents will come to the realization that the local court can effectively
resolve disputes and that relationships and personal connections will no
longer serve as a substitute for clearly defined legal relationships. Third,
an independent judiciary with authority to hold the state in check will
receive legitimacy among rural localities. Village citizens will see that
judicial power can be used not just to resolve internal village disputes but
also to hold unbridled power of the state and the party in check.1 96
If it is concluded that existing judicial institutions cannot
sufficiently mimic the role that judges have played in rural China in the
past, and at the same time develop the characteristics of consistency and
independence, it may be advantageous to modify existing judicial
institutions and develop a new one. The new institution could be
composed of officials who would fulfill the combined roles of a
chancellor in equity in a common law system, a mediator in the modern
legal setting, and an imperial magistrate in the historical Chinese system.
These new magistrates would serve to balance the equities of the parties
and mediate their disputes. Just as a chancellor in equity under a
common law legal tradition, the new magisterial official would
administer justice "according to fairness as contrasted with strictly
formulated rules of common law."'1 97 The equity system ameliorated the
harshness of common law rules in favor of fairness. 198 The existing court
system could also be modified so that Basic People's Court judges would
no longer be directly responsible to local level party officials, and no
longer closely tied to individual villages.199 Any parties aggrieved by the
decision of the local magistrate could have their dispute tried before the
Basic People's Court.
VI. Economic Reform: A Case Study for Progress Toward Judicial
Independence
While reform towards an independent judiciary presents ideological
and implementation challenges, many of those challenges have already
been met in the context of economic reform. One can likely predict the
future path of judicial reform by reviewing the PRC's path to economic
195. Id. at 1680-82, 1701.
196. Id. at 1705.
197. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990).
198. Id.
199. Diamond, supra note 123, at 83-84.
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reform within the rural and enterprise settings.
Rural reform in China commenced not at the center of the party
state, but rather within the villages of rural China.200 Reform began as a
series of experiments with the household responsibility system after the
failure of the Dazhai production system. 20 1 The Dazhai production
system made higher level commune production brigades the basic unit of
account for production instead of lower-level teams.20 2 The household
responsibility system left production decisions to the family and not to
production brigades, stressed autonomy of the production team,
encouraged sideline production, and restored the notion of private
plots. 20 3 The success of the responsibility system coupled with the
lobbying efforts of the Chinese Rural Development Group resulted in
eventual adoption of the household responsibility system in official party
documents.204
By contrast, enterprise reform commenced at the center of the party
state in top-down fashion. 20 5  Enterprise reform posed a greater
ideological challenge to official communist party ideology.20 6 Because
of the great ideological challenge, reformers were much more careful in
their approach to reform and in the language chosen to present reform to
party officials.20 7 Enterprise reform also posed a real threat to party
power and to the tax dollars that the party depended upon from state-
owned enterprises.20 8 Any mishap could have resulted in disaster to the
party. 209  After much study and debate, the party eventually
acknowledged the power of the market and gave state-owned enterprises
more authority to respond to market forces. Over time, incrementally,
the center embraced the notion of enterprise reform in favor of a market
approach instead of a planned approach. t0
Reform towards an independent judiciary shares similarities with
both rural reform and enterprise reform. Just as the rural villages began
to experiment with the household responsibility system, the Supreme
People's Court has, on one occasion, engaged in the process of
constitutional review. Other courts have begun the process of creating a
precedent system to insure consistency of decisions on interpretation of
200. FEWSMITH, supra note *, at 19.
201. Id. at 20.
202. Id. at 19-20.
203. Id. at 20-21.
204. Id. at 34-41.
205. FEwsMrrT, supra note *, at 56.
206. Id. at 64-65, 80.
207. Id. at 80.
208. Id. at 56-57.
209. Id. at 57.
210. FEWSMITH, supra note *, at 63, 75-79.
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the law and on sentencing for criminals. 211 Just as the Chinese Rural
Development Group carefully studied and advocated for rural reform,
scholars in China and elsewhere abroad are lobbying for the
independence of China's court system in their scholarship. China's
association with the WTO and the necessity for an independent judicial
system to support its economic growth make it extremely likely that the
current trend towards a more independent judiciary will continue.
As with enterprise reform, judicial independence poses great
ideological and practical challenges to party control. However, just as
the party embraced market ideology and compromised its
presuppositions about a planned economy, the party has already
embraced the notion of an independent judiciary in concept. The party
has already taken the first step towards accepting independent judicial
review by enacting the ALL. While independent courts could well
compromise party control, just as enterprise reform could have
undermined the party's power and its tax coffers, the party can only
conclude that such a risk is essential. Otherwise, the engine of economic
development and international investment fueling it in China could stall,
and the party's legitimacy before its increasingly rights-conscious people
could plummet.
VII. Conclusion
The Chinese Rural Development Group advocated practical
incrementalism and chose "crossing the river by feeling the stones" as its
mantra.2 12 While it is unlikely that complete judicial independence will
emerge immediately, the CCP will likely make its way incrementally
towards an independent judiciary. The party simply has too much to lose
by not moving towards judicial independence and too little to gain by
preserving the status quo.
211. Lin, supra note 5, at 300-02.
212. FEWSMITH, supra note *, at 39.
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